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Worker Power, Trade Union Strategy, and International Connections:  
A Cross-National Comparison of Dockworker Unionism in Latin America 
 
Abstract 
This article analyzes the constitution of dockZRUNHUV¶SRZHU and its impact on trade 
union strategy in recent labor disputes in Chile and Colombia. 'RFNZRUNHUV¶ strategic 
location in the economies of both countries would predict a high degree of shop-floor 
power among both groups. However, in practice, Colombian dockworkers had far less 
shop-floor power than their Chilean counterparts as a result of mitigating social and 
SROLWLFDOIDFWRUV&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH\GHYHORSHGDVWUDWHJ\,WHUPµKXPDQULJKWVXQLRQLVP¶
relying on external allies and lawsuits for leverage, rather than shop-floor action. 
'RFNZRUNHUVLQ&KLOHLQFRQWUDVWDGRSWHGDVWUDWHJ\,WHUPµFODVVVWUXJJOHXQLRQLVP¶
relying on nationally and internationally coordinated shop-floor action. I therefore 
propose an expanded model of ZRUNHUV¶structural power incorporating the role of state 
and society to better account for power differentials and divergent strategic pathways 
among workers who share a common position in the economic system.  
 
Keywords: worker power, trade union strategy, labor internationalism, Chile, Colombia 
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Introduction 
In recent years, dockworkers in Chile and Colombia have been engaged in major labor 
disputes with wide-ranging impacts for labor movement revitalization in both countries. 
Nevertheless, despite the similarities of sector and region, they have pursued highly 
divergent strategies to achieve their goals. In Chile, dockworkers developed a strategy I 
term class struggle unionism. This strategy focused on exercising power at the point of 
production through a series of coordinated national strikes in the ports, assisted by local 
community allies and international labor allies, who threatened a blockade of Chilean 
FDUJR7KHLUDFWLRQVUHVXOWHGLQDVWXQQLQJYLFWRU\LQZKLFKWKHGRFNZRUNHUV¶QDWLRQDO
organization ± despite lacking legal recognition ± compelled the government to engage in 
national tripartite collective bargaining at the sectoral level for the first time since the 
Allende era. Conversely, in Colombia, dockworkers pursued a strategy of human rights 
unionism. This strategy focused on exercising power outside of the workplace, relying on 
international pressure and support, along with lawsuits, to fight for basic union 
UHFRJQLWLRQDQGDILUVWFRQWUDFWVLQFHWKHHDUO\¶V7KHLUHIIRUWVUHVXOWHGLQDILUVW
contract for a small group of workers LQ&RORPELD¶s largest port, Buenaventura -- an 
important, though limited, victory. How can we account for the very different strategies 
of unions organizing in the same region who share a common position in the economic 
system? 
Dockworkers present an ideal case for research into questions of worker power, 
trade union strategy and internationalism because of the central role they play in the 
circulation of commodities and capital (Bonacich and Wilson 2008) and the existence of 
two global union organizations that seek to represent their interests (Fox-Hodess 2017; 
 3 
Gentile 2017). Dockworkers have long been viewed as an exceptionally powerful and 
well-organized group of workersZLWKDKLJKGHJUHHRIPLOLWDQF\RUµVWULNH-SURQHQHVV¶ 
(Kerr and Siegel 1954). Carmichael and Herod (2012) argue, ³The fact that dockers are 
fixed in space, are from the same communities, and so are socialized in similar ways . . .  
means that they have had opportunities to develop the kinds of formal and informal 
networks emerging out of their communities' habitus that can encourage solidarity and 
FRPPRQDFWLRQ´ In addition, ³dockers have been able to use their employers' 
geographical immobility, manifested through the spatial embeddedness of the latter's 
capital investments in ports, agaLQVWWKHPZKHQRUJDQL]LQJ´Carmichael and Herod 
2012: 218) 'RFNZRUNHUV¶FRQFHQWUDWLRQDQGHPEHGGHGQHVVLQORFDOSRUWFRPPXQLWLHVDQG
their central role in the accumulation of capital both nationally and transnationally have 
therefore constituted them as an at least potentially quite powerful group of workers. The 
specificities of their industry, moreover, allow them to move back and forth with relative 
ease among multiple scales ± local, national and transnational ± as they seek an 
advantage in disputes (Carmichael and Herod 2012), often producing new economic 
geographies in the process (Herod 1997).  
 
Structural and Associational Power 
The dominant theory of worker power in global labor studies, first proposed by 
Erik Olin Wright (2000) and later developed by Beverly Silver (2003), would suggest 
that dockworkers therefore SRVVHVVDKLJKGHJUHHRI³VWUXFWXUDOSRZHU´DQGPRUH
specificall\³ZRUNSODFHEDUJDLQLQJSRZHU´ZKLFK³accrues to workers who are 
enmeshed in tightly integrated production processes, where a localized work stoppage in 
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DNH\QRGHFDQFDXVHGLVUXSWLRQVRQDPXFKZLGHUVFDOHWKDQWKHVWRSSDJHLWVHOI´Silver 
2003: 13) In other words, workplace bargaining power is the power workers possess at 
the point of production, to be leveraged through industrial action, compelling employers 
(or the state) to reach an agreement. Dockworkers in countries like Chile and Colombia 
are predicted to have a high degree of workplace bargaining power as a result of their 
FRXQWULHV¶GHSHQGHQFHRQH[SRUWLQJSULPDU\JRRGVWKURXJKWKHLUSRUWV1HYHUWKHOHVVLQ
only one of the two cases ± Chile ± were dockworkers actually able to make use of their 
position in the economic system by stopping the flow of commodities and capital through 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VSRUWV,Q&RORPELDRQWKHRWKHUKDQGGRFNZRUNHUVUHOLHGRQH[WHUQDO
pressure ± ZKDW6LOYHUZRXOGFKDUDFWHUL]HDV³DVVRFLDWLRQDOSRZHU´¶-- to compel 
employers to come to the bargaining table without exercising power on the shop-floor.  
The cases, then, call attention to the limitations of the existing framework for 
ZRUNHUSRZHUZKLFKYLHZV³VWUXFWXUDOSRZHU´DVWKH³power that results simply from the 
locatLRQRIZRUNHUVZLWKLQWKHHFRQRPLFV\VWHP´ZKLOH³DVVRFLDWLRQDOSRZHU´UHVXOWV
IURP³WKHIRUPDWLRQRIFROOHFWLYHRUJDQL]DWLRQVRIZRUNHUV¶LQWUDGHXQLRQVDQGSROLWLFDO
SDUWLHV´2OLQ:ULJKWThis framework dichotomizes structural power as 
economic and associational power as social and political. However, it also dichotomizes 
structural power as a set of structural background conditions and associational power as 
the agentic social and political actions workers take proactively, thereby reducing 
structure itself exclusively to the economy. Consequently, the framework makes it 
difficult to account for cross-national differences among workers who would seem to 
share a similar degree of power at the point of production but nevertheless pursue very 
different strategies, as with the Chilean and Colombian dockworkers analyzed in this 
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study. 
 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)  
Nevertheless, alternate explanations for cross-national strategic differences among 
trade unions ± in particular, the Varieties of Capitalism approach -- bend the stick too far 
in the other direction, over-emphasizing national-level institutional factors at the expense 
of factors rooted in the economy. The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach emerged 
initially as an attempt to disproYHWKHµFRQYHUJHQFH¶WKHVLV± that is, that advanced 
capitalist democracies were converging on the same economic model, a thesis that had 
become all the more convincing with the rise of neoliberal globalization (Howell 2003). 
Broadly speaking, VoC is a historical institutionalist approach interested in understanding 
how the organization of capitalist economies within given polities becomes 
institutionalized over time, leading to enduring cross-national differences via a process of 
path dependency (Howell 2003). Within the field of Industrial Relations, this emphasis 
on the continuity of cross-national differences provides a useful jumping off point for 
WKHRUL]LQJZK\³the same [trade union] strategy is likely to produce different results in 
different countriHV´)UHJH and Kelly 2004: 182). Industrial Relations scholars and others, 
building on the VoC tradition, provide useful correctives to the heavily firm-centric 
account of its originators, instead bringing the state and labor ± and thus an analysis of 
unequal relationships of power -- back into the analysis (Howell 2003). This corrective 
has made it more possible to explain how change occurs in institutional arrangements 
over time (Hamann and Kelly 2008)± a key critique of the original formulation of the 
theory. 
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Yet, additional critiques remain pertinent. Heyes et al (2012), for example, note 
WKDWWKH9R&DSSURDFKFRQWLQXHVWRVXIIHUIURPDODFNRI³DQDQDO\VLVRIFDSLWDOLVPDV
VXFKWKHFRQFHSWRIFDSLWDOLVQRWHPSOR\HG7KHUHDUHQRµFDSLWDOLVWV¶LQthe VoC 
DFFRXQWRQO\µ¿UPV¶´In particular, the neglect of workplace and industry-level 
IDFWRUVVWUXFWXULQJZRUNHUV¶DELOLW\WRHQJDJHLQVKRS-floor contention makes it difficult 
to explain why workers in different worksites or economic sectors within the same 
country often pursue quite different strategies, for example, as with the West Coast and 
(DVW&RDVWGRFNZRUNHUVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQ.LPHOGRUI¶VFODVVLF8) study. As 
Kimeldorf finds³early patterns of occupational recruitment and industry structure . . . 
giving rise to radically different political cultures, made certain outcomes in the form of 
organizing strategies, modes of industrial conflict, and leadership policies more likely, 
WKRXJKE\QRPHDQVFHUWDLQ´7KHVHµUDGLFDOO\GLIIHUHQWSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHV¶FRQVLVWRI
DXQLRQGRPLQDWHGE\µUHGV¶RQWKH:HVW&RDVWDQGDXQLRQGRPLQDWHGE\µUDFNHWV¶RQ
the East Coast ± a difficult phenomenon to account for without reference to more locally 
and industrially-specific factors than the nationally and institutionally-focused VoC 
approach allows.   
Additionally, the VoC approach, which focuses overwhelmingly on differences 
between the advanced capitalist democracies, has retained its heavily eurocentric bias. As 
Ebenau (2012), a Latin Americanist, arguesWKHUHLV³DUHODWLYHLJQRUDQFHRIWKH
systemic, transnational structures and processes in which institutions at the nation-state 
OHYHODUHHPEHGGHG´DV³SDUWVRIDKLHUDUFKLFDOO\VWUXFWXUHGJOREDOSROLWLFDO
HFRQRP\´LQ³ZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOµYDULHWLHV¶DUHQRWHTXDODVXQLWV´6LOYHU¶VWorld 
Systems framework, in contrast, is much better equipped to analyze these global 
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dynamics, which often play such an important role in shaping the outcomes of labor 
disputes in Latin American and elsewhere in the Global South.  
A final limitation of the VoC approach concerns an additional set of largely 
invisible background assumptions that also reflect its origins in the Global North: the 
expectation that labor-capital conflict takes place against a stable institutional framework, 
in which workers have effective recourse to the law and state-sanctioned or state-
sponsored violence is rare or non-existent. These assumptions, in fact, are not met in 
much of the Global South, including many countries in Latin America, where they are 
arguably far more fundamental to the outcomes of labor-capital disputes than the nuanced 
institutional differences emphasized by VoC theorists.  
 
The Limitations of Existing Theoretical Approaches 
To summarize then, while Silver arguably over-emphasizes the role of economic 
factors in explaining trade union strategy at the expense of socio-political factors, the 
varieties of capitalism approach arguably underemphasizes economic factors at the 
expense of the socio-political. Moreover, neither approach adequately theorizes key 
GLPHQVLRQVRIWKHVWDWH¶VUROHLQODERUFRQIOLFWVoutside of the Global North. A broader 
theorization of the role of the state in labor conflicts ± particularly in the Global South ± 
therefore is needed. 
To this end, ,DUJXHWKDWµVWUXFWXUDOSRZHU¶-- OLNH:ULJKWDQG6LOYHU¶V
µDVVRFLDWLRQDOSRZHU¶-- is rooted in state and society. I therefore propose an 
expanded framework for structural power, detailed below, that takes account of its 
simultaneously economic, social and political foundations, drawing on insights from 
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economic sociology, which emphasizes that markets never exist in isolation but instead 
are constituted through social and political means (Polanyi 2001). This expanded 
framework provides greater analytical leverage for explaining why workers who are 
presumed to share a high degree of power at the point of production as a result of their 
common position in the economic system may nevertheless pursue very different 
strategies in different socio-political contexts both within and between countries.  
In his influential book on worker power, trade union strategy and labor 
internationalism in Latin America, Anner (2011) argues that state contexts determine 
whether or not unions see a need to pursue new strategies, as a result of the retrenchment 
of industrial relations systems and availability of government allies. Yet there are many 
other ways in which state action shapes worker strategy in Latin America. Stillerman 
(2017), for example, examines industrial labor disputes in historical perspective in Chile 
and finds that the ability of workers located in economically strategic positions to resist 
their employers depended heavily on a range of state actions, including reclassification of 
skilled workers, implementation of public-SULYDWHSDUWQHUVKLSVDQG³OHgal provisions 
SHUPLWWLQJXQLRQEXVWLQJ´6WLOOHUPDQWKHUHIRUHILQGVWKDW6LOYHU³XQGHUHVWLPDWHV
WKHVWDWH¶VUROHLQVKDSLQJLQYHVWPHQWDQGODERUSROLF\HVSHFLDOO\LQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV
WKDWXQGHUZHQW,6,´DVZHOODVLQ³HVWDEOLVKLQJLQFRPH policies, or setting the terms 
RIZRUNHUV¶OHJDODFWLRQ´6DQWLEixH]5HEROOHGRZULWLQJRQGRFNZRUNHU
labor conflict in the early 20th century in Northern Chile, challenges the notion that 
dockworkers historically have had anything more than purely abstract, theoretical power 
at the point of production as a result of their position in the economic system. Instead, in 
practice, the Chilean VWDWHV\VWHPLFDOO\FRQVWUDLQHGGRFNZRUNHUV¶DELOLW\WRH[HUFLVH
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power by utilizing the armed forces and prisoners as strike-breakers, engaging in violent 
repression of striking workers and allowing employers to create blacklists (211) ± a 
practice that continues into the present. Finally, Gill (2016: 8), in her study of working-
class organization in the Colombian river port city of Barrancabermeja, similarly 
emphasizes the role of state-VDQFWLRQHGYLROHQFHDV³one of the major tools that forges the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIFDSLWDOLVWUHODWLRQV´ 
It is this more capacious understanding of the role of the state in shaping worker 
power and trade union strategy that I develop in this paper. Like Anner (2011), I find that 
workers situated in the same industry often pursue different strategies in different 
national contexts. However, while Anner argues that this results IURPZRUNHUV¶DJHQF\LQ
the form of union political orientations (2011: 11, 167), I instead find that divergent 
strategies ultimately result from socio-SROLWLFDOGLIIHUHQFHVVKDSLQJZRUNHUV¶DELOLW\WR
exercise power at the point of production. In particular, I highlight the role of pervasive 
state-sanctioned violence and the absence of labor law enforcement in the Colombian 
FDVHZKLFKWDNHQWRJHWKHUWHPSHUHGWKHLPSDFWRIGRFNZRUNHUV¶SRVLWLRQLQWKH
economic system, discouraging workers from taking industrial action. As a consequence, 
Colombian dockworkers pivoted towards human rights unionism, a less risky strategy to 
life and livelihood in a context of pervasive violenceGHVSLWHWKHLUSUHGHFHVVRUXQLRQ¶V
more militant history. Chilean dockworkers, conversely, maintained their shop-floor 
power within a relatively more normalized context for trade unionism. Consequently, 
they had more strategic possibilities available to them and ultimately chose a strategy of 
class struggle unionism as a result of WKHLUXQLRQ¶VSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\. In other words, 
contra Anner (2011), union political histories did not carry equal weight in all contexts, 
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PDNLQJDQLPSDFWRQO\LQWKHFDVHLQZKLFKZRUNHUV¶SRZHUDWWKHSRLQWRISURGXFWLRQ± 
and, therefore, a wider range of strategic possibilities ± was maintained. 
In contrast to the dominant strand of the Varieties of Capitalism literature, I 
therefore argue that within Latin America, the socio-political factors most determinative 
RIZRUNHUV¶SRZHU and strategy are not found primarily in the formal institutions of labor 
relations ± which in any case remain highly unfavorable to dockworkers in both countries 
-- EXWLQVWHDGLQWKHVWDWH¶V willingness to enforce the law, on the one hand, and its 
willingness to intercede on behalf of labor or capital by commission or omission in ways 
that go beyond the bounds of the law, on the other. In other words, like Industrial 
Relations scholars in the VoC school, I share the view that state action is determinative. 
But rather than emphasizing institutional arrangements, I instead emphasize dimensions 
of state action rarely considered by VoC theorists whose work focuses primarily on the 
Global North. Most critically, I highlight the extent to which states agree to tacitly permit 
extralegal violence against trade unionists (as in the Colombian case); to call in the police 
or army to punish striking workers (in both the Colombian and Chilean cases, at 
difference moments); and to enforce the law (in the Chilean case) as central to dispute 
outcomes.     
 
Conjunctural Analysis RI:RUNHUV¶ Structural Power 
This analysis builds on the insights of Antonio Gramsci and Nicos Poulantzas 
with respect to the simultaneously economic, political and social roots of class formation 
and political strategy (Przeworski 1977) and applies them to discussions of the roots of 
worker power and trade union strategy. Because of the central role of the state in 
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reproducing the conditions for the accumulation of capital, international trade and 
economic growth, conflicts between labor and capital always necessarily involve the 
state. State and society, therefore, are no mere contexts for the exercise of worker power; 
they are deeply imbricated in the constitution RIZRUNHU¶VSRZHUERWKDWWKHSRLQWRI
production and in the society at large. The state, in particular, constitutes workHUV¶SRZHU
at the point of production by defining the rules of engagement of class struggle via 
repressive means (use of the police, army, courts and prisons) as well as generative 
means (laws governing collective bargaining and industrial action). In order to be 
successful, worker strategy must therefore be responsive to the conjuncture of state, 
economy and society that constitutes their power at specific times and places. 
The different strategies employed by the Chilean and Colombian dockworkers, 
then, reflect the fact that they are responding to very different conjunctures. As Almeida 
(2008) finds in his historical research on social movement mobilizations in El Salvador -- 
and as I found in the Colombian case -- under conditions of repression and/or weak 
HIIHFWLYHJXDUDQWHHVRI³DVVRFLDWLRQDOIUHHGRPVDQGEDVLFKXPDQULJKWV´, trade unions and 
RWKHUFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQL]DWLRQV³must use whatever political space the state offers in 
RUGHUWREXLOGFLYLFRUJDQL]DWLRQV´Under these circumstances, the state is 
relatively unconcerned with building broad consent, in the Gramscian sense, and instead 
relies more heavily on coercion, permitting a high degree of violence and weak to non-
existent enforcement of labor law. Trade unionists, particularly those operating in conflict 
zones like the Buenaventura dockworkers, therefore rely on external pressure, such as 
international alliances and lawsuits, WRIRUFHWKHVWDWH¶VKDQGUDWKHUWKDQWKHIDUULVNLHU
proposition of directly confronting employers (and, by extension, the state) at the point of 
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production.  
While the Colombian state claims legitimacy primarily on the basis of its ability 
to manage civil conflict ± a project based largely on coercion -- the post-dictatorship 
Chilean state claims legitimacy on the basis of its promise to expand rights and social 
protections ± a project based largely on building consent. While many actors in civil 
society, and trade unionists in particular, rightly question the extent to which the post-
Pinochet Chilean state has foOORZHGWKURXJKRQWKHVHSURPLVHVWKHVWDWH¶VFRQFHUQZLWK
maintaining legitimacy on this basis does appear to result in greater self-imposed 
limitations on permitting or carrying out action hostile to workers relative to Colombia. 
As a result, in a number of sectors in recent years, from retail and warehousing to mining 
and the docks, workers have met with perhaps surprising success. While it is undeniable 
that labor law in Chile, as in Colombia, remains hostile to workers, Chilean workers have 
relatively more effective recourse to the law and extra-state violence targeting trade 
unionists is rare, providing activists with greater room to maneuver. When the Chilean 
state does resort to the use of force to quell militant labor struggles, as in the 
dockworkers¶GLVSXWH, there are clear limits to its willingness to adopt a strategy of 
outright coercion as its legitimacy depends on its ability to make the at least partially 
credible claim that it upholds the human rights of its citizens. Consequently, as Almeida 
(2008) found in El Salvador GXULQJµSHULRGVRIOLEHUDOL]DWLRQ¶, repression tends to result 
in a doubling-down on militancy as workers hedge their bets on the perceived limits of 
WKHVWDWH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVto engage in actions that may risk a further intensification of 
protest. As a consequence, the Chilean state may prefer to offer concessions to contain 
the possibility of movement expansion and shore up its legitimacy. 
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Implications for Trade Union Strategy 
In the Chilean case, then, the relatively more favorable context for trade unionism 
, coupled with the maintenance of a union-controlled hiring hall system despite partial 
privatization of the ports, have allowed dockworkers to exploit the leverage provided by 
their central position in the economic system. In Buenaventura, Colombia, on the other 
KDQGGRFNZRUNHUV¶SRZHUDWWKHSRLQWRISURGXFWLRQhas been weakened through a 
number of factors. Foremost among these factors are the climate of pervasive violence 
carried out with impunity by paramilitary successor groups; the almost complete absence 
of labor law enforcement; and the presence of a large surplus labor force resulting from 
the armed conflict in the surrounding countryside which, together with the privatization 
RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRUWVKDVVHYHUHO\XQGHUPLQHGZRUNHUV¶DELOLW\WRFRQWUROWKHODERU
supply, a key determinant of labor-capital conflict in ports globally. These factors have 
therefore tempered GRFNZRUNHUV¶ability to exploit the leverage provided by their central 
position in the economic system, leading them to pursue a human rights strategy of 
external pressure in lieu of shop-floor action. Nevertheless, given Colombian 
GRFNZRUNHUV¶ZHDNSRZHUDWWKHSRLQWRISURGXFWLRQWKHGHFLVLRQWo target for organizing 
a group of workers who possessed a relatively greater degree of shop-floor power ±
skilled machine operators with permanent contracts -- made a critical difference. In a 
similar vein, in Chile, where dockworkers possessed a greater degree of power at the 
point of production to begin with, their position in the economic system was leveraged 
effectively with a well-conceived shop-floor strategy targeting export-oriented ports 
handling primary commodities at key moments, while counting on allied workers in other 
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ports to refuse to handle diverted cargo.  
These findings on the divergent strategies of dockworkers in Chile and Colombia 
have important implications for global union organizations seeking to represent Latin 
American workers. I cRQFXUZLWK9RQ%XORZ¶VILQGLQJWKDW³WKHUHLVQRVLQJOH
type of labor internationalism waiting to be discovered. To understand the potential of 
and the obstacles to labor collective action across borders, it is crucial to consider the 
complex inWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQG\QDPLFGRPHVWLFSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WVDQGODERU¶V
embeddedness in new multiscale and cross-VHFWRUDOQHWZRUNV´7KHFDVHVWKHQDUH
suggestive of the wide variety of global union organization responses ± from international 
blockades to normative pressure to financial support -- that may be appropriate to 
different local and national contexts. Rather than adopting a one size fits all model, I 
conclude that global union organizations should instead develop flexible approaches to 
international solidarity and trade union strategy responsive to the needs of workers who 
share a similar position in the economic system and yet possess divergent degrees of 
power at the point of production as a result of differing socio-political conjunctures at the 
national level.  
 
Research Design  
In total, forty-one interviews were conducted with local and national union 
leaders and international labor and NGO allies. In-country interview-based research was 
carried out in early 2015 with dockworker unionists active in the Chilean port cities of 
Talcahuano (6), Valparaíso (4), San Antonio (2), Mejillones (1), Antofagasta (1) and 
Iquique (6). For the Colombian case, in-country interviews were carried out in early 2015 
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in the cities of Cartagena (3) and Buenaventura (5), with additional Colombia-specific 
interviews carried out in the Netherlands (1), England (1) and Denmark (4) in 2016 to 
better understand the significant international dimensions of the case. Additional 
interviews conducted in Argentina (1), Uruguay (1), France, (2), and Spain (3) in 2014 
and 2015 contributed to my analysis of international solidarity in both cases. The smaller 
number of Colombia-specific interviews (14) reflects the fact that this case focuses on 
organizing efforts in a single port, while the Chilean case, with 20 country-specific 
interviews, was a nationwide strike. Interview-based research in both countries was 
supplemented by the large body of primary and secondary literature by scholars, 
MRXUQDOLVWV1*2¶VDQGSROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQVRQWKHFDVHV 
As noted above, dockworker unions provide a key test case for understanding 
worker power because national economies depend on them for participation in the global 
capitalist system ± particularly in economies dependent on the export of primary goods. 
Yet, while Chile and Colombia share the characteristics of being middle-income, export-
oriented South American countries with highly neoliberal orientations -- of countries in 
Latin America, only Chile and Colombia make it in the top-tier rankings of the right-
ZLQJ+HULWDJH)RXQGDWLRQ¶VLQGH[RI³HFRQRPLFIUHHGRP´-- significant socio-
political differences in each country create very different contexts for trade unionism. 
:KLOHWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGH8QLRQ&RQIHGHUDWLRQ¶V5) Global Rights Index ranked 
&KLOHLQWKHPLGGOHRIWKHVFDOHDVDFRXQWU\ZLWK³UHJXODUYLRODWLRQVRI>ODERU@ULJKWV´
Colombia was the sole South American country to receive a ranking at the low end of the 
VFDOHDVDFRXQWU\ZLWK³QRJXDUDQWHHRI>ODERU@ULJKWV´%\KROGLQJSRVLWLRQLQWKH
economic system constant while selecting countries in which the socio-political 
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conditions for trade unionism are highly divergent, my research design allows me to 
pinpoint the role of state and society in shaping worker power and strategy. 
 
Colombia: International Pressure to Win Basic Union Rights 
Colombia has historically had a relatively weak labor movement, due in large part 
to the long-standing armed conflict and high levels of state repression consistently 
assisted by the United States (Bergquist, 1986). As Rochlin (2011: 199) argues: 
³A Modern nation state that monopolized the use of force, institutionalized 
conflict resolution mechanisms, a state presence across the country, political legitimacy, 
and notions of balance and human rights have proven to be illusive for Colombia. This is 
true not only with respect to comparing Colombia to the North, but to Brazil, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Mexico, Chile and other states that have achieved some key components of 
the Modernist ideal.´ 
Though strong labor unions have existed historically, particularly in export-
oriented sectors such as petroleum and the ports, gains have been substantially eroded 
VLQFHWKH¶V&RQVHTXHQWO\5RFKOLQILQGVWKDW³&RORPELDQODERU
VWUXJJOHVZLWKLQ/DWLQ$PHULFD¶VPRVWYLROHQWULJKW-ZLQJDQGFULPLQDOL]HGHFRQRP\´
This is even more true in Buenaventura, an isolated city with a 90% Afro-Colombian 
population long neglected by the central state, in which paramilitary successor groups 
wield tremendous power (Centro Nacional de Memória Histórica 2015). With the 
exception of the recent militarization of the city since 2014, the federal government is 
notable for its near total absence (Centro Nacional de Memória Histórica 2015). 
Additionally, according to Hawkins (2017: 24), in his work on the Buenaventura 
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dockworkers, "The industrial relations framework in Colombia offers little space for 
effective union organization." As in Chile, the law does not permit unions "to negotiate 
collective bargaining agreements by industry or sector, a factor that significantly lowers 
the rate of CBA coverage across the economy and the unions' ability to take wages out of 
competition" (24). Hawkins (2017) additionally highlights the tremendous gap between 
ODERUODZDVZULWWHQRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGLW¶VDOPRVWQRQ-existent enforcement, on the 
other (29-30) ± even after the passage of the Labor Action Plan, which specifically 
targeted the port sector and was put in place to mollify the US government during 
negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement (40).  
Nevertheless, Colombia is highly dependent on maritime transport, with 96.1% of 
imports entering the country by sea and 98.7% of exports leaving by sea (Hamburg Sud) 
through six major seaports. There are two legitimate and competing national unions 
engaged in organizing workers in the ports sector, the Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores del Transporte (SNTT) and the Unión Portuaria de Colombia (UPCO), in 
addition to a much larger number of what are essentially labor subcontractors 
masquerading as unions, which have not been included in this study. Both organizations 
are affiliated to the CUT, a leftwing national labor confederation. At the international 
level, the SNTT is an affiliate of the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), 
while the UPCO is an affiliate of the International Dockworkers Council (IDC). Please 
see Appendix 1 for a list of trade union acronyms.  
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The context for trade union work is extremely difficult given the climate of state-
sanctioned violence in the Buenaventura area. With regards to the ports, a national leader 
of the UPCO, based in Cartagena, reported: 
³,KDYHQ¶WVHHQWKUHDWVWKDWKDYHOHGWRGHDWKV%XWLIWKDWGLGKDSSHQWKH8QLyQ
3RUWXDULDFRXOGQ¶WGRDQ\WKLQJ%XHQDYHQWXUDDQG8UDEá are really dangerous ± WKHUH¶V
drug trafficking, guerrillas, paramilitaries. If one day one of those groups tells us not to 
JRWKHUHDQ\PRUHEHFDXVHWKH\ZLOONLOOXVZHFRXOGQ¶WJRDQ\PRUH:HGRQ¶WKDYHWKH
resources, the vehicles, nothing.´  
Lower-level violence and threats are even more prevalent. Buenaventura is in fact 
the most dangerous major city in the country. A Human Rights Watch Investigation 
³IRXQGDFLW\ZKHUHHQWLUHQHLJKERUKRRGVZHUHGRPLQDWHGE\SRZHUIXOSDUDPLOLWDU\
VXFFHVVRUJURXSVZKRUHVWULFWUHVLGHQWV¶PRYHPHQWVUHFUXLWWKHLUFKLOGUHQH[WRUWtheir 
businesses, and routinely engage in horrific acts of violence against anyone who defies 
WKHLUZLOO´LQFOXGLQJPXUGHUYLDGLVDSSHDUDQFHVRUGLVPHPEHUPHQWDW³FKRS-XSKRXVHV´
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(Schoening 2014). Local union reps from Buenaventura reported in interviews that many 
members had sent away one or more children to live in other parts of the country or join 
the army to avoid forcible recruitment into armed groups. Jhon Jairo Castro, a local 
leader in the UPCO, was issued a bulletproof vest after facing threats on his life 
following his participation in a delegation to Washington DC highlighting labor 
conditions at the port (Hawkins 2017: 36). A national survey of dockworkers carried out 
by the UPCO consequently found that while 50% of those surveyed had a positive 
opinion of the labor movement, 70% of those surveyed reported being afraid to join a 
union out of fear of losing their jobs due to anti-union practices in the ports.  
Nevertheless, from 1959-1993, Colombian dockworkers had one of the strongest 
labor unions in the country, in terms of employment stability, wages and benefits 
-LPpQH]3pUH]DQG'HOJDGR0RUHQR&RORPELD¶VSRUWVZHUHRZQHGDQGRSHUDWHG
by the state through the company COLPUERTOS. The law privatizing the ports paved 
the way for third-party contracting of labor services and severe informalization, 
destroying the union. The UPCO has estimated from its survey that today, approximately 
4000 port workers are employed directly, while approximately 12000 are subcontracted 
workers ± the vast majority of whom are Afro-Colombian -- laboring in precarious 
situations of informality. Local leaders from both unions concurred that subcontracting is 
the root problem they face in organizing. 
As a result, in addition to being the most dangerous major city in the country, and 
GHVSLWHKRVWLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VODUJHVWSRUW, Buenaventura LVWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRRUHVWPDMRU
city. Because of the ongoing armed conflict in the surrounding countryside -- 
Buenaventura is the national leader in terms of internal displacement (Schoening, 2014) -
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- there is an enormous industrial reserve army in the city and some workers are so 
desperate that they sleep on the street outside of the port terminals waiting for work. 
Nearly 80% of its 375,000 residents live in poverty (Nicholls and Sánchez-Garzoli, 2011) 
and 40% are unemployed (Schoening, 2014). As a national UPCO leader from Cartagena 
SXWLW³RXU>KLVWRULFDOXQLRQ¶V@GLVDSSHDUDQFHIUom Buenaventura made [higher 
HFRQRPLF@VWUDWDVGLVDSSHDUIURPWKHFLW\´$VHFRQGQDWLRQDOOHDGHU from 
Cartagena DUJXHGWKDWKLVWRULFDOO\³7KHXQLRQZDVHYHQVWURQJRXWVLGHRIWKHSRUWLQ
Buenaventura ± they determined the labor relations outside of the port. The union would 
fight for the rights of other workers. When that union disappeared with the privatization, 
subcontracting and precarity were seen not only in the port but in the whole city. . . 
%HIRUHWKHEXVLQHVVRZQHUVGLGQ¶WGDUHGRZKDW WKH\GRQRZ´7RGD\EDVLFDPHQLWLHV
like regular access to potable water are sorely lacking, and the average life expectancy of 
fifty-one is far lower than the national average (Nicholls and Sánchez-Garzoli, 2011).  
The workforce is dominated by subcontractor agencies, allowing the terminal 
operators to evade their responsibility to provide mandated social benefits and permanent 
contracts; providing them access to a flexible labor force that can be expanded or 
contracted on a day to day basis; and making it much more difficult for workers to 
organize (Nicholls and Sánchez-Garzoli, 2011). A small minority of skilled workers at 
the port employed on permanent contracts as machine operators have somewhat better 
wages and working conditions than the vast majority of casual laborers, but wages and 
conditions are still very poor, as is their job security. Work shifts can be as long as thirty-
six hours, and wage theft is rampant (Bacon, 2014). Overtime, holiday, night work and 
weekend wages are not paid, nor are workers paid when work has to stop because of the 
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rain, even though Buenaventura is one of the rainiest places in the world (Aricapa, 2006). 
Since the port was privatized, there have been more than thirty reported on-the-job 
fatalities and many times more serious injuries (Nicholls and Sánchez-Garzoli, 2011.)  
 
Unión Portuaria de Colombia  
The UPCO was formed in 2002 by a group of retired Cartagena dockworkers who 
had been active in the former national union of COLPUERTOS, the state-owned ports 
compan\ZKLFKZDVGLVVROYHGLQWKHHDUO\¶VDIWHUWKHSULYDWL]DWLRQRIWKHSRUWV 
(Interview, national UPCO leader, Cartagena)%HWZHHQWKHHDUO\¶VDQGWKH
founding of the UPCO chapter in Buenaventura in 2008, there was limited union activity 
at the port, none of it ultimately successful (Interview, local UPCO rep, Buenaventura). 
In 1997, dockworkers participated in a weeklong citywide strike for an eight-hour 
ZRUNGD\³7KHUHZHUHVRPHEHQHILWV%XWLWGLGQ¶WODVWORQJ%HFDXVHWKHDJUHHPHQWWKDW
the unioQKDGWKH\KDGEDGDGYLFHDQGWKH\GLGQ¶WVLJQLWZLWKWKHELJFRPSDQLHVEXW
with the small cooperatives [illegal subcontractors] . . . Also, some of the union leaders 
became very close with the Sociedad Portuaria DQGJRWEHQHILWVIRUWKHPVHOYHV´
(Interview, local UPCO rep%XHQDYHQWXUD$VDUHVXOW³WKHGDPDJHKDGEHHQGRQH$QG
LWZDVGLIILFXOWWRUHJDLQWKHZRUNHUV¶WUXVW´ 
From 2009, with significant support from the AFL-&,2¶V6ROLGDULW\&HQWHUand 
the CUT labor federation (Hawkins 2017), the UPCO began a campaign of grassroots 
organizing, including union trainings, assemblies, marches and other base-building 
activities in Buenaventura. Organizing activities culminated in a mass mobilization in 
2012 in support of 120 dockworkers who had gone on strike over the issues of 
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subcontracting and wages and working conditions of the directly employed. In the short 
term, the strike was a success, bringing together skilled machine operators on permanent 
contracts with unskilled casual workers (Hawkins 2017: 38), and the UPCO reached an 
agreement on labor formalization with major terminal operators. However, the victory 
was short-lived as false employer promises were used to coax workers away from the 
union (Interview, local UPCO rep, Buenaventura). After another strike six months later, 
the employer refused to negotiate and the government declined to intervene. The 
company issued threats and formed its own company union, canceling the contracts of 
subcontractors who employed union activists. Many activists were blacklisted from 
ZRUNLQJDWWKHWHUPLQDO+DZNLQV$VDUHVXOW³6WDUWLQJZLWKPHPEHUVZH
ended up with just 19. The pressure was really tough. The ministry did nothing. With 
those 19 comrades, we started doing consciousness raising. And little by little we 
UHJDLQHGFUHGLELOLW\´,QWHUYLHZORFDO83&2rep, Buenaventura).  
7KHVHH[SHULHQFHVSUHVHQWHGWKHXQLRQZLWKDNH\GLOHPPD³HLWKHU\RXJRWRD
VWULNHZKLFKZHGRQ¶WKDYHWKHVWUHQJWKWRGRDQGWKH\FDOOXVWHUURULVWVRUZHJRWRD
tribunal and it takes three, four or even five years. The problem is the employers and the 
JRYHUQPHQW7KH\¶UHERWKDJDLQVWXV´,QWHUYLHZORFDO83&2rep, Buenaventura) 
Consequently, the union returned to a strategy of putting pressure on the primary 
operators and government via legal complaints and international allies to force the 
companies to get rid of the estimated 240 subcontractors in the port; directly hire 
workers; engage in collective bargaining; and compel the government to enforce labor 
law in the sector (Interviews, local and national UPCO leaders, Buenaventura and 
Cartagena). This strategy has been facilitated, in part, through the campaign to include 
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and subsequently enforce the labor provisions of the Free Trade Agreement between 
Colombia and the United States, which has provided ample opportunities to work with 
RUJDQL]DWLRQVIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RORPELD¶VPDMRUWUDGLQJSDUWQHU (Interview, 
international NGO staff member). International partners framed the struggle in terms of 
human rights both in trainings with union activists in Buenaventura and in advocating for 
them abroad (Hawkins 2017: 33, 35)   
In 2015, given the difficulties of organizing the subcontracted workforce, the 
UPCO in Buenaventura sought to organize permanent machine operators at the TCBUEN 
terminal of the port, following on their short-lived success in 2012. IDC Latin America 
Zone Coordinator Mauricio Zarzuelo, from Buenos Aires, participated actively in the 
campaign and, along with Ricardo Suárez, president of the ID&¶V8UXJXD\DQDIILOLDWH
supported the UPCO in their negotiations with the employer (Interview, IDC leader, 
Buenos Aires). Nevertheless, as the UPCO was pivoting towards a focus on organizing 
permanent workers, the SNTT pivoted from the Caribbean coast to Buenaventura 
(Interview with international NGO staff member). Ultimately, though the UPCO was 
successful in signing a landmark agreement with the Sociedad Portuaria and TECSA in 
July, 2015 (IDC 7/10/15), the agreement fell apart after the SNTT succeeded in hiring a 
NH\QDWLRQDORUJDQL]HUIURPWKH83&2DQGDIILOLDWLQJQHDUO\DOORIWKH83&2¶VQHZ
members (Interview with international NGO staff member).  
 
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Transporte 
The Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Transporte (SNTT) is a national union 
representing workers in the transportation sector. In 2004, at its Congress, the CUT, a 
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national labor confederation, took the decision to prioritize the formation of sectoral 
unions in Colombia through the merger of smaller company-level unions (Interview, 
FNV staff member, Amsterdam). In the transportation sector, the FNV, the largest union 
in the Netherlands, provided funding for this initiative in a project carried out in 
conjunction with the ITF (Interview, FNV staff member, Amsterdam). Though the aim of 
the project was to amalgamate existing CUT-affiliated unions, the SNTT has primarily 
expanded via new organizing efforts (Interview, FNV staff member, Amsterdam). 
7KH6177VLJQHGWKHXQLRQ¶VILUVWFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQWfor 
dockworkers at the COMPAS terminal in the Port of Cartagena in 2012 ± a first for 
Colombian dockworkers since 1993 (Interview, local SNTT reps, Cartagena). 
Dockworkers active in the SNTT in Cartagena emphasized that they had been successful 
in their efforts because they had focused on organizing permanent workers at the 
terminal, with an eye to building power at the point of production that could be leveraged 
to organized subcontracted workers over the long-run (Interview, local SNTT reps, 
Cartagena). They contrasted their efforts with those of the Unión Portuaria in Cartagena: 
³DERXWWKUHH\HDUVDJRWKH\KDGDZRUNVWRSSDJHKHUHLWZDVQ¶WVXFFHVVIXO7KH\ILUHG
WKHPDOO´DQG³WKHUHVWRIWKHVXEFRQWUDFWHGZRUNHUVGLGQ¶WVXSSRUWWKHP´EHFDXVH³WR
PDNHDODERUPRYHPHQW\RXQHHGSROLWLFDOSRZHUZLWKLQDFRPSDQ\DQGWKH\GRQ¶WKDYH
LW>DVDUHVXOWRIEHLQJVXEFRQWUDFWHG@7KH\FDQ¶WFDOODPDQDJHUWRQHJRWLDWH´(Interview, 
local SNTT reps, Cartagena).  
As noted above, in 2015, the SNTT began organizing in earnest in Buenaventura, 
GXULQJWKH83&2¶VKLVWRULFQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK7(&6$ZLWKVLJQLILFDQWDVVLVWDQFHIURP
the ITF, entering into the negotiations and ultimately affiliating most of WKH83¶V
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members (Interviews with international NGO staff member). The SNTT accused the 
UPCO of myriad internal problems regarding organizational transparency and 
GHPRFUDF\DVZHOODVWKHFDVXDOZRUNHUOHGRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRDGHTXDWHO\UHSUHVHQW
permanent workers at the port (Interviews with international NGO staff member). The 
UPCO saw it differently, accusing the SNTT of opportunistically turning up at the last 
minute to poach their members using superior resources from international allies without 
having put in the long years of difficult, dangerous organizing work on the ground in 
Buenaventura that the UPCO had (Interviews with international NGO staff member).  
In April, 2016, the ITF held an international conference on port work in 
Cartagena, inviting affiliates from Northern Europe to participate. Danish dockworkers 
from the union 3F agreed to assist the SNTT in putting pressure on Maersk, a Danish 
company that has regular consultation meetings with the Danish dockworkers union and 
that had acquired the TECSA terminal in Buenaventura the previous year (Interviews 
with national elected leader and staff member, 3F, Copenhagen). As a result of on-the-
ground organizing efforts in Buenaventura, coupled with 0DHUVN¶VLQWHUHVWLQSUHVHUYLQJ
its reputation in Denmark as an ethical employer (Interviews with national elected leader 
and staff member, 3F, Copenhagen), the company signed an agreement with the SNTT in 
July, 2016. However, the union has struggled to effectively enforce the contract in 
Buenaventura without bringing further power to bear at the point of production 
(Interviews with international NGO staff member). 
Colombian Case Analysis  
%HFDXVHGRFNZRUNHUV¶shop-floor power has been eroded, both the SNTT and the 
UPCO have pursued a human rights strategy, focused primarily on external pressure 
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rather than industrial action, in their efforts to organize and raise standards for port 
workers in Colombia. In essence, socio-political conditions have all but foreclosed the 
possibility of other strDWHJLHVIRUWKHSUHVHQW'RFNZRUNHUV¶ODFNRIYLDEOHDOWHUQDWLYH
strategic pathways in this highly-constrained context is most clearly evidenced by the 
total defeats suffered in 1997 and 2012 when they had adopted a more militant approach 
involving mass organizing and industrial action in Buenaventura. The injection of 
VLJQLILFDQWIXQGVIURPWKH,7)¶V'XWFKDIILOLDWHDVZHOODV,7)WUDLQLQJLQ
professionalization and support from the Danish affiliate 3F, have given the SNTT a 
major advantage in implementing the human rights strategy. 
'RFNZRUNHUV¶lack shop-floor power in Buenvantura primarily because of the 
climate of state-sanctioned violence and the absence of labor law enforcement. In 
contrast to Chile, repression in Colombia has therefore tended to lead toward diminished 
participation as trade unionists correctly assume that the state does not view severe 
violations of their rights as a threat to its own legitimacy and consequently will not 
intervene to enforce even the most basic legal norms. For this reason, they have turned to 
a strategy of human rights unionism ± built on external pressure via international allies 
and lawsuits -- rather than a strategy of class struggle unionism focused on developing 
shop-floor militancy. Yet, despite the convergence of the two Colombian XQLRQV¶
strategies as a result of the socio-political constraints they face, the SNTT met with 
greater success7KLVZDVWKHUHVXOWRIWKHXQLRQ¶Vlong-term decision to target permanent 
machine operators who, in an environment of exceptionally low shop-floor power for 
dockworkers in general, have a higher degree of shop-floor power that was successfully 
utilized to pressure the employer. 
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Chile: A National Strike for Sectoral-Level Unionism 
In contrast to Colombia, Chile historically had a strong labor movement which 
was the most radical in Latin America (Bergquist 1986; Palacios-Valladares 2010). Close 
ties to leftwing parties within one of the most institutionalized democracies in the region 
fostered a culture of class struggle unionism with often explicitly political aims. But 
during the seventeen-year-long Pinochet dictatorship, trade union activists were among 
the most likely to be disappeared, imprisoned or tortured, and labor law was rewritten to 
WKHGHWULPHQWRIZRUNHUV:LWKWKHUHWXUQWRGHPRFUDF\LQWKHHDUO\¶VKRSHVZHUH
high for labor movement revitalization, but the pacted transition, which ensured a 
significant degree of continuity with the Pinochet era, undermined the possibility of mass 
labor unrest (Winn 2004). Nevertheless, in contrast to Colombia, Chile has among the 
lowest levels of violence in the region and workers have at least some effective recourse 
to the law. Although legal changes during the dictatorship, such as the shift from sectoral 
level bargaining to unionization at the enterprise level, have in many ways undermined 
WKHODERUPRYHPHQW¶VSRZHUWKH\KDYHFRXQWHULQWXLWLYHO\PDGHLWHDVLHUWRIorm unions 
and maintain accountability to the membership, allowing unions to establish strong 
internal democracy and militancy within a relatively safe environment (Bank Muñoz 
2017). Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of successful labor activism in many 
sectors, including mining, warehousing, retail and education. 
&KLOH¶VHFRQRP\LVKLJKO\GHSHQGHQWRQWKHFRXQWU\¶VWKLUW\-six ports, which 
KDQGOHDURXQGRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VIRUHLJQFRPPHUFH$ODUJHPDMRULW\RI&KLOH¶V
dockworkers are affiliated to the autonomous and decentralized Unión Portuaria de Chile 
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(UPCH), a national organization based on the principles of direct action and mutual aid 
that groups together distinct left political tendencies at the local port level. (Despite the 
coincidence of name, the Unión Portuaria de Colombia and the Unión Portuaria de Chile 
are entirely separate organizations.) Individual port locals from the North have affiliated 
to the International Dockworkers Council, though the UPCH as a whole is not affiliated. 
Non-UPCH dockworker unions, from the COMACH and COTRAPORCHI federations, 
are a minority in the country with a presence in a handful of ports. They are affiliated to 
WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDQVSRUW:RUNHUV)HGHUDWLRQ5HSUHVHQWLQJDPLQRULW\RIWKHFRXQWU\¶V
GRFNZRUNHUVWKH\DUHVHHQE\WKH83&+DV³\HOORZXQLRQV´This view was confirmed 
through an interview with a leader from a large COTRAPORCHI affiliate in Valparaiso: 
³ZHDUHVHUYLFHSURYLGHUVZHVHHRXUVHOYHVDVDEXVLQHVV´DQG³ZHKDYHDVWURQJDQG
good relationship with the employers . . . unfortunately in San Antonio and the 8th Region 
[Bío-Bío]WKH\ZLQHYHU\WKLQJZLWKFRQIOLFW´ 
Today, there are approximately 8000 port workers in Chile, of which the majority are 
casual workers. Legal changes to the status of port unions during the dictatorship, such as 
ending the system of registered work permits and instituting a system of casual labor 
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(Gaudichaud, 2015) -- coupled with the partial privatization of the ports beginning in 
1998 ± threatened to erode the shop-floor power of dockworkers. Yet, in contrast to 
Colombia, dockworkers have maintained a significant degree of power at the point of 
production through maintaining the nombrada, essentially a union-controlled hiring hall 
(Interviews, local union reps, Talcahuano and Iquique). 
In the past fifteen years, propelled by the Bío-Bío region in the south, &KLOH¶VSRUW
unions have gradually begun to reorganize themselves at the national level (Interviews, 
local union reps, Talcahuano). Many leaders located formative family experiences in a 
history of struggle against the dictatorship, including within the Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria (MIR), the principal extra-parliamentary revolutionary party in Chile in 
WKH¶V (Interviews, local union reps, Talcahuano). Today, many leaders in 
Talcahuano (the southern Bío-Bío region) and in Iquique (in the far North) are closely 
connected to the Izquierda Libertaria, an anti-capitalist formation that is strong within the 
student movement, while leaders at San Antonio formerly had ties to the center-left 
Socialist Party, and leaders at Mejillones were closely connected to a small Trotskyist 
party (Interviews, local union reps, Talcahuano, Iquique, San Antonio).  
The UPCH, divided into five regional branches, was formed at the national level 
in 2011 following several years of organizing work. The UPCH has no executive officers 
but operates through a system of voceros, or spokespeople, who are only empowered to 
speak on decisions taken by dockworkers at their local assemblies, with regional and 
national level meetings typically taking place every 1-2 months (Interviews, local union 
reps, Talcahuano). Additionally, unlike the local unions that comprise it, the UPCH itself 
LVVWHDGIDVWO\D³VLQGLFDWRGHKHFKR´± a de facto union ± QRWD³VLQGLFDWRGHGHUHFKR´± a 
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legally recognized union (Interviews, local union reps, Talcahuano). Proponents of the 
³VLQGLFDWRGHKHFKR´PRGHOSRLQWWRWKHJUHDWHUHDVHRIFRRSWLQJDQGFRUUXSWLQJXQLRQ
leaders from legally recognized unions, as well as a range of tactical benefits of operating 
outside the bounds of labor law (Interviews, local union reps, Talcahuano and Iquique). 
UPCH activists are united by an analysis of their power at the point of production³WKH
economy of this country passes through our hands. So if we stop work, the economy of 
this country stops. TKHIRUHLJQFOLHQWVEHJLQWRJHWKXQJU\´,QWHUYLHZ, local union rep, 
Talcahuano) 
7KHPRVWUHFHQWFKDSWHURIWKH&KLOHDQGRFNZRUNHUV¶VWUXJJOHEHJDQLQ0DUFKRI
2013 at the northern Port of Angamos in the city of Mejillones. The UPCH affiliate at 
Mejillones had been engaged in a fight for the right, not recognized in Chilean law, to 
negotiate a collective agreement covering both permanent and casual workers at the port 
(Interview, local union rep, Iquique). Among the key issues was the right as mandated 
under Chilean law to a paid half-hour lunch break ± the media hora. This right was not 
being respected by employers (Interview, local union rep, Iquique). Mejillones is a highly 
strategic port. It is the principal port for CODELCO (Osorio, 2013), the state-owned 
copper company, nationalized under Allende, which is the top producer of copper in the 
world and major source of revenue for the Chilean state. Nevertheless, Mejillones 
historically had much less of a union legacy than other ports (Interview, local union rep, 
Iquique). The strategic position of the port, the fight for the media hora and the 
opportunity to build the union in Mejillones were key factors in the other UPCH 
DIILOLDWHV¶GHFLVLRQWRVXSSRUWWKHPInterviews, local union reps, Talcahuano, Iquique, 
San Antonio). 
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In total, the first national strike for the UPCH lasted for three weeks and 85% of 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VSRUWVSDUWLFLSDWHGInterviews, local union reps, Talcahuano and Iquique). 
Hundreds of police officers were bussed in in an effort to keep the port operational during 
the strike (Interview, local union rep, Iquique). Tear gas and water cannons were fired at 
striking dockworkers and a union rep ended up in the hospital after being violently 
detained by the police (IDC, 3/26/13).  The ITF-affiliated non-UPCH unions did not 
SDUWLFLSDWHDQGDFFHSWHGGLYHUWHGFDUJRXQGHUFXWWLQJWKH83&+¶VDELOLW\WRH[HUWSUHVVXUH
(Interview, local union rep, Iquique). The strike threatened the Chilean fruit harvest, a 
key export industry, as well as retailers facing shortages of basic imported consumer 
goods (Ogalde, 2013), with the national Chamber of Commerce estimating losses at $2 
billion. An agreement was subsequently reached with the employers via the 
intermediation of the rightwing Piñera government to pay a large settlement to each 
worker for not having respected the media hora (Interviews, local union reps, Talcahuano 
and Iquique). Ultimately, the employers did not follow through on the agreement, setting 
the stage for the conflict in 2014 (Interviews, local union reps, Talcahuano and Iquique). 
Once again, the strike began with the UPCH affiliate in Mejillones and was met 
with a significant police presence. Dockworkers organized a round-the-clock blockade of 
the port, physically blocking both cargo and potential strike-breakers from the ITF-
affiliated unions with their bodies (Interview, local union rep, Iquique). A dockworker 
union rep from Iquique who was sent to assist with the strike in Mejillones reported:  
³2XUZRUNZDVPDLQO\WRSUHvent them from being able to move cargo inside the 
port, and to prevent the train from entering. . . it arrives three times a day with copper 
from all the mines in the north of Chile. . . thousands and thousands of tons a day. . . We 
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had to go threaten the owner of the railway with the workers. I myself went, and I said, 
µLI\RXWU\DJDLQWREULQJWKHWUDLQLQVLGHWKHSRUW\RX¶UHJRLQJWREHFRPHDPXUGHUHUDQG
,¶PJRLQJWREHFRPHDPDUW\UEHFDXVH,ZLOOWKURZP\VHOIRQWKHWUDLQOLQH¶$QGWKDW
impacted him so much that he never tried again to get the train in or the police force or 
DQ\WKLQJ´ 
Additional clashes with police (which would also be a key feature of the strike in 
San Antonio); a pre-existing mutual aid agreement; the decision to continue the fight for 
the media hora; and individual port issues led the other ports to join the strike in January 
(Interview, local union rep, Iquique).  
In other words, while employer repression in response to industrial action in 
Colombia led to defeat and a pivot away from shop-floor action, in Chile, the expectation 
that WKHUHDUHOLPLWVWRWKHVWDWH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRYLRODWH democratic norms during disputes 
led to an intensification of the struggle, which quickly became national. Leaders from the 
UPCH across Chile understood that the most important victory in the strike would not be 
monetary but would instead be in obligating the government to engage in national 
sectoral-level collective bargaining for the first time since before the dictatorship, as well 
as winning a joint agreement for permanent and casual workers ± all in spite of the law 
(Interviews, local union reps, Talcahuano, San Antonio, Iquique).  
International solidarity was utilized to put pressure on the Chilean state to reach 
an agreement with the employers. The IDC sent a letter to the government threatening to 
boycott Chilean cargo at the height of the fruit harvest (Interview, IDC representative, 
Buenos Aires). The letter was widely publicized in the Chilean media, amplifying a 
movement that had struggled gain public attention (Interviews, local union reps, Iquique 
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and Antofagasta). 7KH$VVRFLDWLRQRI)UXLW([SRUWHUV³:KHQWKH\IRXQGRXWDERXW>WKH
GHFODUDWLRQ@WKDWFDPHIURPRXWVLGHWKHFRXQWU\SUHVVXUHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW´,QWHUYLHZ
local union rep, Iquique). Furthermore, union leaders argued that the IDC declaration had 
served to embarrass the Chilean government, which is particularly sensitive to 
perceptions outside of the country (Interviews, local union reps, Iquique))LQDOO\³IRU
[the workers] it was like, wow!, over there in Europe or in Spain or Argentina, they are 
paying attention to the conflict. . . Psychologically, it helped people a lot with their 
spirits, to have the will to keep fighting´Interview, local union rep, Iquique) Within 
Chile, external support from student activists, as well as workers in other sectors, played 
a critical role as well (Interviews, local union reps, San Antonio, Talcahuano, Iquique).  
Negotiations at the national level came to focus on the issue of enforcing the 
media hora ± both implementing it in the present and paying back wages owed. Out of 
the ensuing negotiations, the government ultimately passed a ley corta clearly 
establishing the right to the media hora for dockworkers without increasing the length of 
the workday; setting a large sum per worker in back-pay for the media hora; and 
establishing a National Day of the Dockworker commemorating dockworker leaders 
killed during the dictatorship. The agreement reached on the media hora back-pay 
amounted to $750000 CH ± three times the monthly minimum wage -- for each year 
worked, per worker, since 2005 (Gaudichaud, 2015). Additionally, the government 
promised to subsequently work on a ley larga governing working conditions in the sector 
more broadly, as well as three on-going mesas de dialogo to discuss specific health and 
safety issues facing dockworkers (Interview, local union rep, Antofagasta). 
Though the national strike and subsequent negotiations with the government and 
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employers resulted in a major, precedent-setting victory, lasting damage to the local 
XQLRQVLQ0HMLOORQHVDQG6DQ$QWRQLRXQGHUPLQHGWKH83&+¶VDELOLW\WRFDUU\RXW
actions at a similar scale in the near-term. Through legal means, the main UPCH affiliate 
in Mejillones was all but destroyed. Further south, a detailed investigation carried out by 
the non-partisan Centro de Investigación Periodística found that an employer conspiracy 
resulted in splitting the union in San Antonio (Figueroa, 2014), though the UPCH still has 
a significant presence there. Leaders and activists from both Mejillones and San Antonio 
were blacklisted, as were supporters from the non-UPCH affiliated ports of Arica, 
Coquimbo and Valparaíso (Díaz and Santibáñez 2014). Thus, although the Chilean 
dockworkers were able to successfully win enforcement of their legally-mandated lunch 
break, and although there were limits to the state¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRHQJDJHLQYLROHQW
repression, the law in other respects was by no means on their side.  
Since that time, the UPCH has been involved in efforts to unite workers in the 
core export-oriented productive sectors of the economy to build towards political strikes 
over key issues of interest to Chilean workers more generally, such as an end to the 
privatized AFP pension system created during the dictatorship, which they struck for in 
2016 during national protests. As a local union rep from Iquique SXWLW³7KHSROLWLFDO
class as much as the citizenry know that when the dockworkers . . . strike, we go out en 
PDVVHWRWKHVWUHHWVZHPDNHRXUVHOYHVKHDUG´$VDUHVXOW³:HEHOLHYHWKDWVWRSSLQJWKH
country [by stopping work], we can fix things for everyone. . . Because [the ports] are the 
EUHDNLQJSRLQWIRUWKHVWDWHWKHORVVHVDUHLQWKHELOOLRQV´,QWHUYLHZlocal union rep, 
Talcahuano).  
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Chilean Case Analysis  
Within a socio-political context that allowed workers to maintain a high degree of 
shop-floor power, ZRUNHUVGUHZIURPWKHLUXQLRQ¶VSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\WRSXUVXHDFODVV
struggle strategy, pushing at the margins of the possible in 2014 and 2015. The 
expectation that minimal democratic norms would be respected during labor conflicts 
meant that employer and state repression led to increased participation in industrial 
action, rather than diminished participation, as in the Colombian case. Leftwing legacies, 
continued through the lived experience of UPCH activists ± in particular, with the 
historical Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria and the contemporary Izquierda 
Libertaria ± have contributed to the development of a militant and politically-engaged 
unionism built on the principle of mutual aid at the ports and bolstered by support from 
left-oriented groups in civil society and internationally. I therefore concur with Manky 
(2018: 595), who concluded from his research on subcontracted miner mobilizations in 
&KLOHWKDW³LQSRVW-authoritarian societies of the Global South, and particularly in those 
where unionism has historically had a class orientation, political activists remain crucial 
DFWRUV´ 
1HYHUWKHOHVVFODVVVWUXJJOHXQLRQLVPLVQRWWKHRQO\VWUDWHJLFSRVVLELOLW\LQ&KLOH
WRGD\7KH,7)DIILOLDWHVGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWFODVVFROODERUDWLRQLVPLVDOVRDQDYDLODEOH
VWUDWHJ\DVDUHIRUPVRIPLFURFRUSRUDWLVP%HQVXVDQ3DODFLRV9DOODGDUHV
DQGWRDPRUHOLPLWHGH[WHQWKXPDQULJKWVXQLRQLVP3XEOLF6HUYLFHV,QWHUQDWLRQDO
E\QRPHDQVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHOLVW/HGE\9DOSDUDtVRWKH,7)DIILOLDWHGFODVV
FROODERUDWLRQLVWXQLRQVSXUVXHGDOHJDOLVWVWUDWHJ\GXULQJWKHGLVSXWHILOLQJDODZVXLW
ZKLFKZRXOGKDYHDFKLHYHGRQO\PLQLPDOVWULFWO\HFRQRPLFGHPDQGVRQWKHPHGLDKRUD
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ZKLOHDFWLYHO\VHHNLQJWRXQGHUPLQHWKHPRUHPLOLWDQWDFWLRQVDQGSROLWLFDOREMHFWLYHVRI
WKH83&+E\VHUYLQJDVVWULNHEUHDNHUVILOPLQJDFWLRQVDQGRWKHUZLVHFROODERUDWLQJZLWK
WKHDXWKRULWLHVDQGHPSOR\HUV 
7KH83&+GRFNZRUNHUV¶KLJKO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRINH\SUHVVXUH
SRLQWVLQWLPHDQGVSDFHHQDEOHGWKHPWRPD[LPL]HWKHLPSDFWRIWKHLUSRVLWLRQLQWKH
HFRQRPLFV\VWHP¶DQGZDVGHWHUPLQDWLYHIRUWKHLUYLFWRU\8QLRQDFWLYLVWVDLGHGE\
LQWHOOHFWXDOVIURPWKH,]TXLHUGD/LEHUWDULDUHFRJQL]HGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHFRSSHU
H[SRUWLQJ3RUWRI0HMLOORQHVDQGWKHFRQWDLQHU3RUWRI6DQ$QWRQLRWUDQVIHUULQJ
RUJDQL]HUVIURPRWKHUSRUWVWKHUHGXULQJWKHVWULNHWRVWUHQJWKHQWKHLUHIIRUWV6XFFHVVIXOO\
VKXWWLQJGRZQ0HMLOORQHVSXWVLJQLILFDQWSUHVVXUHRQWKHJRYHUQPHQWWRLQWHUYHQHWRUH
HVWDEOLVKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOIORZRIFRSSHUIURPWKHSXEOLFO\RZQHG&2'(/&2PLQH
+ROGLQJWKHOLQHDW6DQ$QWRQLRDQGVRXWKHUQSRUWVSXWVLJQLILFDQWSUHVVXUHRQRWKHU
VHFWRUVRIFDSLWDO±LQSDUWLFXODUH[SRUWHUVRIIUHVKSURGXFHDQGIRUHVWU\SURGXFWVZKRDUH
YXOQHUDEOHWRWLPHGHOD\V±WRSXVKIRUDVSHHG\UHVROXWLRQWRWKHGLVSXWH$VDORFDOXQLRQ
UHSIURP7DOFDKXDQRSXWLW³7KHUHJLRQFDQ¶WGHDOZLWKPRUHWKDQVHYHQGD\VRIZRUN
VWRSSDJHV>DWWKHSRUW@7KHUHLVDEXLOGXSRIWLPEHURIFHOOXORVH7KHVWRUHVEHJLQWRUXQ
RXW:LQWHUEHJLQVWRDUULYH:HXVHWKLVYHU\VWUDWHJLFDOO\´7KHUHVXOWZDVDPDMRU
YLFWRU\IRU&KLOHDQZRUNHUVDVDZKROHUHHVWDEOLVKLQJDQDWLRQDOSUHFHGHQWIRUWULSDUWLWH
VHFWRUDOOHYHOFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJFRYHULQJERWKSHUPDQHQWDQGFDVXDOZRUNHUV 
 
&RQFOXVLRQ 
The dominant framework for understanding worker power would suggest that 
both Chilean and Colombian dockworkers, as a result of their central position in the 
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economic system, have a high degree of power at the point of production to be leveraged 
through industrial action. Comparative research suggests instead that while Chilean 
dockworkers did in fact have a high degree of power at the point of production, the 
presumed shop-floor power of Colombian dockworkers in Buenaventura effectively did 
not exist in practice. In order to explain this finding, I consequently argue the need to 
expand our framework for understanding structural power to include state and society in 
addition to the economy. This more expansive understanding is better able to account for 
substantial cross-national variation among workers whose shared economic position 
would suggest a similar degree of power at the point of production but who nevertheless 
pursue highly divergent strategies.   
Developing a framework that better delineates the roots of worker power at the 
point of production, in turn, allows for a more precise understanding of the field of 
possible strategies open to specific, economically-defined groups of workers in given 
contexts. Like Anner (2011), I found that national-level socio-political context was the 
key factor shaping strategy in both cases. Nevertheless, while Anner emphasizes 
retrenchment of industrial relations systems and the availability of state-level alliances, I 
highlight a number of other ways in which state and society matter. In particular, I 
emphasize the role of state-sanctioned violence and lack of enforcement of labor law in 
determining the very different strategic pathway pursued in the Colombian case relative 
to the Chilean case. These conditions in Colombia have resulted in the creation of a 
highly uneven playing field for labor disputes, in which employers have at their disposal 
a wide range of tools to intimidate, cajole and repress trade union activists. As a 
consequence, the Colombian dockworkers pursued a human rights strategy, relying 
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primarily on external pressure via international allies and lawsuits, rather than industrial 
action. Yet, given the low degree of shop-floor power that dockworkers in general 
possess in Buenaventura, the decision to focus on organizing a group of workers with a 
relatively high degree of shop-floor power ± permanent machine operators ±yielded 
tentative, though positive, results. 
,Q&KLOHFRQYHUVHO\ZKLOHWUDGHXQLRQDFWLYLVWVKDUGO\VWUXJJOHZLWKLQDZRUNHUV¶
paradise (Winn 2004), the expectation that basic democratic norms concerning limits to 
violence and enforcement of the law will be respected have meant that workers have been 
able to effectively leverage their power at the point of production during disputes. The 
maintenance of a union-controlled hiring hall system in Chile, in spite of the partial 
privatization of the ports and in contrast to the Colombian case, moreover, underlines 
how critical control of the labor supply is to maintaining the shop-floor power of workers 
in the port industry. Chilean dockworkers, operating in a less constrained context than 
their Colombian counterparts, had available to them a wider variety of strategic pathways 
DQGXOWLPDWHO\DGRSWHGDFODVVVWUXJJOHVWUDWHJ\DVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUXQLRQ¶VSROLWLFDO
history. Chilean dockworkers effectively leveraged their position in the economic system 
through targeting specific ports at specific moments, drawing the state into the conflict as 
a third negotiating partner. 
In countries like Chile, with relatively open contexts for trade unionism, and in 
countries like Colombia, with highly constrained contexts for trade unionism, some 
generalizable conclusions for labor internationalism may be drawn from these cases. The 
UROHRIWKH,7)LQWKH&RORPELDQFDVHVXJJHVWVWKDWZKHQZRUNHUV¶shop-floor power is 
severely eroded by socio-political forces, international normative pressure targeting both 
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states and transnational employers, as well as funding to support organizing, training and 
other basic union activities, can provide an advantage. The role of the IDC in the Chilean 
case, conversely, suggests that when workers have a high degree of shop-floor power, 
international industrial pressure, in the form of blockades or solidarity strikes, may be 
best suited to win broader gains for workers. Like Von Bulow (2009), then, I find that 
there is no one size fits all model for successful trade union internationalism. Instead, the 
cases suggest the need for a flexible and responsive approach by global union 
organizations that recognizes that workers who share a similar position in the economic 
system may yet possess divergent degrees of power at the point of production as a result 
of national socio-political factors, and strategy should therefore be developed 
accordingly.  
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Appendix I: Organizational Acronyms 
COMACH (Chile) ± Confederación Marítima de Chile 
COTRAPORCHI (Chile) ± Confederación de Trabajadores Portuarios de Chile 
CUT (Colombia) ± Central Única de Trabajadores 
3F (Denmark) -- Fagligt Fælles Forbund 
FNV (Netherlands) -- Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging 
IDC ± International Dockworkers Council 
ITF ± International Transport Workers Federation 
SNTT (Colombia) ± Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Transporte (Colombia) 
UPCH (Chile) ± Unión Portuaria de Chile 
UPCO (Colombia) ± Unión Portuaria de Colombia 
 
 
 
 
 
